The situation in the Gulf has moved from epic fury to epic crisis. Wars reveal, with great clarity, the shape of the world when something is no longer there. We now understand the meaning of choke-points.

The Gulf States produce more than 30% of the world’s oil and around 20% of global gas supply. Fossil fuels still account for 80% of global energy consumption – we are not yet close to displacing this dependence.

The war in the Gulf is as much about the future direction of energy – the post-carbon transition – as it is about current dependencies. The story of the future is not about being trapped in choke-points, but about how to free oneself from them.

The degree of dependence on Gulf oil and gas, which are key feedstocks for a range of products – from fuel for cars and aeroplanes to fertilisers and helium used in chipmaking – will force a rethink on many fronts.

The challenge is that Gulf oil and gas resources are vast and among the cheapest to extract. This helps to explain all this epic fury to gain full control over these resources and, in the view of the carbon establishment, reinforces resistance to the post-carbon vision, which is effectively led by China, even though it is not fully decarbonised.

There is growing speculation, often expressed with great euphoria, that the war in the Gulf could accelerate global decarbonisation.

However, such optimism must be tempered. The world is not suddenly flat, and longstanding structural challenges across various economies remain. This is particularly true for Africa, where high debt levels and lacklustre growth are likely to be further exacerbated. In some respects, this echoes the conditions experienced during the Covid pandemic.

Solving the world’s dependence on oil and gas is far more complex than it appears. What seems simple is often difficult in practice. Those advocating long-term transitions and those grappling with immediate economic pressures face very different stress and pain points.

The closest parallel may be Europe’s response following the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine war. Europe initially moved to secure gas and other fossil fuel supplies from other regions to decouple from Ostpolitik. At the same time, the EU also accelerated its race to alternative energy sources.

Renewables are doing well, but performance could have been much stronger despite support from REPowerEU. An underlying issue, as Brett Christophers notes, is that private firms need to make a profit. Volatile energy markets, such as the EU’s electricity market, can therefore hinder the expansion of renewables, as pricing in liberalised markets does not always provide the right incentives for grid connection.

The EU’s electrification uptake is nowhere near China’s. The bloc also still has a significant gas dependence.

More broadly, fossil fuel dependencies are likely to rekindle interest in energy security and diversification. Renewables and other clean energy solutions will play a major role in this shift. However, the uncomfortable reality in the aftermath of conflict is that we will first move to energy security, with decarbonisation following later, introducing further delays to an already complex transition.

Decarbonisation pathways cannot be universalised because each region or country has a unique context that shapes both the cost and the pace of the transition.

At a global level, two processes are unfolding simultaneously: a reduction in fossil fuel use and the expansion of renewables. For the transition to succeed, renewables must not only displace fossil fuels but also meet existing and future energy demand.

These shifts do not happen in abstraction. Transitions have real effects on people and economies, meaning that they have to be carefully calibrated. At the same time, demand must be met with sufficient supply in a non-inflationary manner. Solar, wind and electric vehicles (EVs) require raw materials, which must be mined and processed, often using the same fossil-fuel-dependent energy systems. Scaling these technologies calls for cheap sources of finance.

History shows that, in times of crisis, geopolitical tensions can give way to necessity. For example, Russian oil and gas have re-entered global markets following the easing of US sanctions.

Similarly, new perspectives may emerge on reassessing China’s role in green technology, particularly to expand access to cheaper sources of solar, wind, storage technologies and EVs.

Crises can make us move in the right direction, but the fundamental contest remains: the unresolved tension between the entrenched carbon economy and the post-carbon future.