The chaos that Donald Trump’s administration has imposed on the global economy escalated sharply on February 28 as the US and Israel launched the Third Gulf War with a “war of choice” attack on Iran.

The US-Israeli action interrupted US-Iranian nuclear talks and prompted from Iran a well thought-through counterattack – first on the US’ key Gulf State allies and then blocking the critical shipping Strait of Hormuz, sending oil prices rocketing to between $90/bl and $100/bl and disrupting supplies ranging from fertiliser for South Africa’s wine farmers to helium for cooling the US’s huge data centres.

Just as sub-Saharan Africa was emerging from earlier shocks – Covid-19 and Russia’s illegal invasion of Ukraine – the US’s equally illegal attack threatens to curtail the return to robust pre-Covid-like growth. Inflation is spiralling in oil-importing and oil-producing countries alike.

While South Africa has turned a corner economically, its Treasury’s most optimistic forecast of 2% growth now looks unlikely with oil as its biggest import item. Morocco, Kenya, Ethiopia and Senegal will be similarly afflicted. Oil producers Algeria, Angola and Nigeria will be winners as oil and gas prices spike. Angola and Nigeria’s reforms will see their treasuries benefit but those same reforms mean fewer fuel subsidies and inflation for consumers.

Moreover, Iran’s retaliation on the Gulf States risks shrinking these States’ massive contribution to Africa’s development financing – from replenishing African Development Bank funds with tens of billions of dollars to investing directly in ports, rail and, most recently, mining ventures. They may pull back funds for domestic reconstruction and increased defence spending.

Dragging the Gulf States into the war has also dented the image they have projected to business elites of being stable, low-tax business enclaves in a volatile neighbourhood. It adds to the risk and uncertainty for African and global companies that have become used to managing Africa operations from offshore bases in Dubai, Doha and Abu Dhabi. That confidence is likely to have shattered for the next decade.

US unilateralism, military and foreign policy chaos continues its wanton undermining of the international community’s ability to use strategically imposed and incrementally hurtful sanctions against rogue regimes, rogue individuals and rogue economies. Incremental sanctions were highly effective against apartheid, ultimately costing South Africa its air superiority in its war against Angola.

Although sanctions have failed to make Zimbabwe more democratic, lifting targeted sanctions is the main issue of the ruling party in any rapprochement with donor countries. Iran also insisted on sanctions relief in recent negotiations.

Trump’s failure to define US war aims or plan for bad outcomes risks locking the US into a Middle East quagmire with no exit plan. He now “demands” the support of unhappy Western allies while Iran’s Revolutionary Guard has less to lose and all to play for.

The Trump administration’s unilateral decision to lift sanctions on Russia’s shadow fleet deliveries to ease oil prices has incensed Western allies who claim the US did not brief them on plans to attack Iran. Oil prices are unlikely to be affected by the measure, but Russia will be appeased. In January, Russia’s oil and gas earnings fell to their lowest since Vladimir Putin launched Russia’s war against Ukraine. With high oil prices, the US volte-face has made up Russia’s shortfall.

The temporary easing of sanctions removes their strategic effectiveness and puts them in the realm of Trump’s tariffs – imposed, only to be removed and reimposed, creating a legal and bureaucratic minefield for businesses.

Sanctions have largely prevented Russian companies from expanding their foothold in Africa and also prevented African firms from becoming suppliers to Russian-owned mining oil and gas companies or from servicing Iran’s 25-million-strong middle class. Secondary sanctions linked to US dollar trade have increased the cost of trade for African countries dealing with Russia and Iran. Yet with Trump imposing a range of arbitrary de facto sanctions on African countries – the most arbitrary being blanket visa bans on people from 26 African countries in a World Cup year (including qualifiers Côte d’Ivoire and Senegal), more of Africa’s governments are pivoting to Russia, the most recent being Madagascar’s military leader, Michael Randrianirina. Ethiopia, meanwhile, took delivery from Russia of armoured vehicles and military aircraft in February.

What’s left of the old order tries to hold the line for the UN Charter, human rights and democratic governance. UN Secretary-General António Guterres in mid-March demanded an end to the Middle East War as he visited the almost forgotten UN peacekeeping force in Lebanon. The EU and the UK are maintaining sanctions on Russia’s shadow fleet. The EU plans next to ban imports of Russia’s platinum group metals and copper and has extended its arms embargo on Zimbabwe until February 2027.

In February, the UK sanctioned six individuals in Sudan for atrocities and warmongering. However, as allegations emerge that the United Arab Emirates is funding and supporting a training camp for some 10 000 fighters of Sudan’s rebel militia, the Rapid Support Forces, the need for multilateral, lawful, coordinated and strategic action is urgent.