There was a time when Taiwan counted several African countries among its allies. Now, only one remains, and even that final relationship is so constrained that its leader cannot freely visit, marking the near-collapse of its diplomatic position on the continent.

Taiwanese President Lai Ching-te was scheduled to visit that sole African ally, Eswatini, from April 22 to 26, but had to cancel the trip after island nations along his planned route – Seychelles, Mauritius and Madagascar – suddenly withdrew permission for his plane to fly over their territories.

One doesn’t need to be a rocket scientist to figure out the reason for the revocations. This was at the behest of China, which considers Taiwan part of its territory. Indeed, in a media statement, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Beijing expressed its “high appreciation” to the “relevant countries’ adherence to the ‘One China’ principle in full compliance with international law”.

Taiwan’s past African allies include Burkina Faso, which severed ties with the Asian nation in May 2018, immediately embracing China. Similar steps were taken by São Tomé and Príncipe in 2016, The Gambia in 2013, Malawi in 2008, and Chad in 2006.

South Africa also features on the list of former Taiwanese allies on the continent, a relationship that was shaped by Cold War-era alignments and ended in 1998, when the then four-year-old post-apartheid government of former President Nelson Mandela switched recognition to China.

These shifts reflect a convergence of economic incentives, diplomatic pressure and strategic calculation, with China offering a level of engagement that Taiwan could simply not match.

Chinese engagement in Africa – particularly through infrastructure finance and trade access – has become one of the major drivers of the continent’s external economic relations over the past two decades.

Estimates suggest that Chinese lenders committed about $180-billion to African countries and institutions between 2000 and 2024, with the bulk of this amount directed towards infrastructure-heavy sectors, including transport and energy. The 2024 financing portfolio of $2.1-billion – 46% down on the previous year’s figure – was concentrated exclusively in four sectors: $1.2-billion across three road or transport infrastructure projects in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Kenya and Angola; $760-million for an electricity transmission line in Angola; $85-million for water and sanitation infrastructure in Senegal; and $76.5-million for the financial services sector in Egypt.

What’s more, China has become Africa’s largest bilateral trading partner, absorbing about 20% of the continent’s exports and serving as the source of 16% of its imports, according to International Monetary Fund statistics. This is supported by the physical infrastructure that China has helped finance, including ports, rail corridors and road networks that facilitate the movement of raw materials and the flow of manufactured goods into African economies.

Beijing has progressively expanded tariff-free or preferential access for African exports, while embedding African markets more deeply into Chinese supply chains. In February, President Xi Jinping announced via a message to the thirty-ninth summit of African heads of State and government that all countries on the continent except Eswatini – Taiwan’s ally – will be eligible for zero-tariff access to the Chinese market from this month.

Before this announcement, China had already granted zero-tariff access to 33 African least-developed countries, effective December 2024.

However, it bears emphasising that the removal of tariffs is not the end of the story. Other trade barriers are still in place: meeting China’s stringent regulations on food safety, labelling and product quality requires investment that most African small businesses cannot afford, and getting goods containers from Africa to China cost-effectively remains an unresolved matter.

A key problem is that economic engagement with China is not politically neutral. Its infrastructure investment and trade access are often accompanied by implicit conditions tied to diplomatic alignment, particularly adherence to the One China principle.

While Beijing doesn’t really formalise political demands in loan agreements, access to infrastructure finance, market opportunities and high-level cooperation tend to be easier for governments that avoid ties with Taiwan and support China in international forums.

The recent drama around the Taiwanese leader’s aborted trip to Eswatini – reportedly because Seychelles, Mauritius and Madagascar were pressured to revoke flyover permits – just shows how receiving Chinese assistance can leave countries vulnerable to its coercive influence.

As a result, Taiwan is left not only with fewer friends but with fewer ways to reach the only one it still has on the African continent.